讲座一
讲座题目：The initiation of audit committee interlocks and the contagion of accounting policy choices: Evidence from special items报告人：Nan ZHOU
报告时间：2019年6月6日14:00-16:00讲座地点：宁远楼429
报告内容：We document that the initiation of audit committee interlocks promotes contagion of accounting policy choices, operationalized with special items reporting. We find that the special items of newly interlocked firms, though unrelated before interlock, become positively correlated afterward, which suggests that information transfer starts with interlock formation. This result holds when we examine negative special items or key components of special items (asset impairments, restructuring costs, and gains/losses from asset sales). We also find that information from larger firms is more influential in interlocks and that information transfer is more effective in interlocks formed within the same industry. Moreover, we use the SFAS 146 issuance as a natural experiment to strengthen our inference that information on flexible accounting policies had been transmitted via interlocks. With further analyses, we address two different endogeneity issues. Taken together, our evidence indicates that accounting policy choices are transmitted via audit committee interlocks.
报告人简介：Nan ZHOU，美国辛辛那提大学会计学Norwood and Marjorie Geis讲席教授、会计学博士项目主任。主要研究领域为审计、财务报告与公司治理。已在The Accounting Review、Journal of Accounting Research、Contemporary Accounting Research等国际顶级刊物上发表论文数十篇。担任Asian Review of Accounting、International Journal of Auditing等期刊的编委、副主编。
讲座二
讲座题目：How do auditors perceive and respond to client firms’ technological peer pressure? Evidence from going-concern opinions
报告人：Joseph H. Zhang
报告时间：2019年6月6日16:00-18:00
讲座地点：宁远楼429
报告内容：We examine how the technological aspect of competition (or technological peer pressure) affects the likelihood that auditors issue going-concern opinions. We find that a client firm’s technological peer pressure increases the likelihood that the firm receives a going-concern opinion. This finding is consistent with the notion that perceived auditor business risk increases with client technological peer pressure so that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with such pressure. Further evidence shows that this positive effect is more pronounced for client firms with greater innovation originality, that are financially constrained, and for auditors facing higher litigation risk. We also find that technological peer pressure reduces the probability of both Type I and Type II misclassifications when auditors exert more effort. Additional analyses show that client firms’ technological peer pressure positively affects the likelihood of using auditors specialized in auditing R&D. Taken together, our study implies that auditors exert more effort to increase audit quality in response to the higher auditor business risk induced by clients’ technological peer pressure, instead of simply being conservative.
报告人简介：Joseph H. Zhang，美国孟菲斯大学副教授，George Johnson 研究员。主要研究方向为资本市场（财务会计和审计）和会计信息系统，近期也关注中国会计问题研究。从2013年开始陆续在Contemporary Accounting Research, Accounting Horizons, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Information Systems, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting等期刊发表约28篇学术论文。担任Asian Review of Accounting 和Managerial Auditing Journal的副主编。进入学术领域之前，曾在美国Fortune 100 公司总部做成本会计实务工作。
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